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REGENT CASES

in the instant case. If this is so, then the Wyoming statute is very restrictive. What would be the result if a workman was assaulted by a third
person because he was a strikebreaker? What decision if a policeman was
shot by a person because he didn't like cops? Surely that is one of the risks
of a policeman's job, but the statute indicates that such an injury would
not be compensable. Did the legislature really intend for the statute to
have this effect? The Wyoming Constitution provides in part: "As to all
extra hazardous employment the legislature shall provide by law for the
accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be
paid compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each person injured in such employment or to the dependent
families of such as die as the result of such injuries, except in case of in12
In
juries due solely to the culpable negligence of the injured employee."'
8
Fuhs v. Swenson' the court stated: "It is apparent from the constitutional
clause and the several provisions of our state law . . . that the accident
which places the employee beyond the pale of the law for the purposes of
making awards must be due solely to the 'culpable negligence' of the
injured employee." Also in Zancanelli v. Central Coal and Coke Co.14 the
court said: "the compensation law is not intended to give compensation
as damages, but is more in the nature of accident insurance."
In view of the references of the Wyoming court to a liberal construction of the compensation law and the constitutional provision previously
referred to, it appears that the court has the attitude of the liberal view.
Does the statute referred to obstruct the carrying out of the court's view
and the declared spirit of the Wyoming compensation law? That question
will have to remain unanswered until the meaning of the statute is clarified.
GLENN W. BUNDY
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ACTION AGAINST ONE WHO ENTICED THEIR PARENT?

Two minor children through guardian ad litem brought suit against
a third party who allegedly enticed their father,, thus depriving them of his
bounty, love and affection.' Defendant's motion to dismiss was based on
the theory that since the gravamen of the complaint was one for alienation
of affections it was prohibited by the state's heart-balm legislation. 2 The
12.
13.

Article 10, Sec. 4.
58 Wyo. 293, 131 P.2d 333 (1942).

14.

25 Wyo. 511, 17S P. 981 (1919).

1.
2.

The mother as guardian, brought this suit in her own name as well. It was held
her cause of action was barred by interdiction of the heart-balm which abolished
suits for alienation of affection.
Fourteen states have specific provisions dealing with alienation of affection actions:
Alabama. Ala. Code tit. 7, Sec. 114-117

(1940);

California, Cal. Civ. Code, Sec.

43.5 (1951); Colorado, Colo. Ann. Stat. C. 24A, Sec. 1-10, Michie Cum. Supp. (1952);
Florida, Fla. Ann Stat. Sec. 771.01-771.08 (1951); Illinois, Ill. Ann. Stat. Chap. 68,
Sec#. 34-47 (1951), this statute supplanted the one interpreted by the -court in
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motion was granted, not on the ground that the statute had abolished this
alienation type action but because of practical difficulties that would
result if the children's claim were recognized. The Court adopted the
principle laid down in the leading case of Taylor v. Keefe,3 in which the
following objections were enumerated: (a) possibility of a multiplicity of
suits, (b) possibility of extortionary litigation by virtue of the relative
tenuousness of the child's relationship, (c) inability to define the point at
which status of a child ceases, (d) inability of a jury adequately to cope
with the question of damages, particularly because damages thus assessed
are apt to overlap, in view of the number and different ages of the children.
Held, that the infants had no cognizable cause of action. Klienow v.
Ameika, 19 N. J. Super 165, 88 A.2d, 31 (1952).
Examination of fourteen reported cases 4 (representing the federal
courts and nine different states) wherein the facts were comparable to
those evidenced in this most recent case revealed three barriers, any one
of which, if utilized by the courts, deny plaintiff the opportunity to obtain
redress. When the events occurred in jurisdictions whose legislators had
not abolished actions for alienation of affections, some courts, 5 after making
an appraisal of the benefits and burdens to be derived if such suit were'
allowed, dismissed the complaint. Others 6 referred to common law principles, and finding no precedent for the maintenance af this type of litigation, denied their power to indulge in judicial empiricism to create a new
remedy. If the statutory law of the State abrograted alienation suits, it

3.
4.

5.
6.

Daily v. Parker; Indiana, Ind. Ann. Stat., Sec. 2-508-2-517 (Burns 1946) ; Maryland,
Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws, Art. 75C, Sec. 1-8 (Cum. Supp. 1947); Michigan, Mich.
Comp. Laws, Sec. 551.301-551.311 (1948); Nevada, Nev. Comp. Ann. Laws, Sec.
4071.01-4071.07 (Supp. 1943-1949); New Jersey, N. J. Stat. Ann., Sec. 2:39A1-2:39A9
(1939); New York, N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act, Sec. 61a-611; Pennsylvania, Pa. Ann. Stat.
tit. 48, Sec. 169-177 (Cum. Supp. 1950); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 9720.59720.10 (Williams Cum. Supp. 1951); Wyoming, Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann., Sec. 3-5123-516 (1945).
Additionally, Maine, Me. Rev. 'Stat. Chap. 99, Sec. 91 (1944);
Massachusetts, Mass. Ann. Laws Chap. 207, Sec. 47A (Cum. Supp. 1950); New Hampshire, N. H. Rev. Laws, Chap. 385, Sec. 11 (1942) presently have some form of
heart-blam legislation.
Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 56 A.2d 768 (1947).
Marrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N. Y. S. 912, (Sup. Ct. 1934), 20 Cornell
L. Q. 255 (1935), 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 276 (1935);; Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174,
162 A.L.R. 819 (7th Cir. 1945); McMillam v. Taylor, 160 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1946);
Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N. E.2d 810 (1947), 1 Wyoming Law
Jounral 194 (1947), 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 400 (1948); Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn.
156, 56 A.2d 768 (1947), 1 Vand. L. Rev. 461 (1948); Garza v. Garza, 209 S. W.2d
1012 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App.2d 454, 190 P.2d 984
(1948); Miller V. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949), 48 Mich. L. Rev.
242, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 63 (1950), 63 Harv. L. Rev. 541 (1950); Russick v. Hicks,
85 F. Supp. 281 (W. D. Mich. 1949); Henson v. Thomas, 231 N. C. 173, 56 S. E.2d
432, 12 A.L.R.2d 1171 (1949), 28 N. C. L. Rev. 397 (1950); Edler v. MacAlphineDownie, 180 F.2d 385 (D. C. App. 1950); Katz v. Katz, 197 Misc., 412, 95 N. Y. S.2d
863 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Nelson v. Richwagen, 326 Mass. 485, 95 N.E.2d 545 (1950);
Gleitz v. Gleitz, 88 Ohio App. 337, 98 N. E.2d 74 (1951).
Morrow v. Yannantuono, McMillam v. Taylor, Taylor v. Keefe, Nelson v. Richwagen, see note 4 supra.
Garza v. Garza, Henson v. Thomas, Elder v. MacAlpine-Downie, Gleitz v. Gleitz,
see note 4 supra.

RECENT CASES

was sometimes held that this legislation prevented plaintiff from instituting
7
legal proceedings.
In only four of these decisions8 (from Minnesota, Illinois and two
federal courts) were the three obstacles disposed of by the judiciary and
the lawsuit resolved on its merits. These tribunals concur in their ability
to establish this right of action in absence of common law precedent, and
all propound the theory of the family as a cooperative enterprise with
correlative rights and duties. Consequently, when an outsider by his wrongful act invades this relationship and entices a parent each individual mem9
ber sustains actionable injury. The Minnesota court in rejecting as un1
convincing the practical obstructions raised in Taylor v. Keefe, stated:
(a) redress should not be denied merely because of difficulties in defining
the child's right or his damages, (b) the frequent occurence of a wrong is
no valid reason against allowing a remedy for it, (c) the argument of multiplicity of suits is factually untrue because, since 1945 when an American
Court for the first time recognized a child's right to sue under these circumstances, there has been no flood of litigation . The obvious conclusion
is that there are not enough such enticements to produce a multiplicity
of suits.,'
Two' 2 of the four forums were faced with heart-balm legislation deliminiting alienation actions. In Daily v. Parker13 it was flatly stated that
nothing in such statutes denied a minor child the right to sue for damages
against a woman who enticed the father. The other court in applying a
Michigan Statute 14 which contained a proviso allowing suits to be instituted against certain named defendants by a plaintiff spouse, construed
the act to be applicable only to the traditional alienation of affections
suits by one spouse against the enticer of the other spouse.
The principal case is unique because dismissal of the complaint was
upon a basis other than one involving the prevailing heart-balm act. In
those prior cases in which the child's suit was disallowed, heart-balm
legislation when available, was always employed to aid in defeating the
claim.' 5 A New York court 16 confronted with substantially similar alien7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.

Rudley v. Tobias, Katz v. Katz, see note 4 supra
Daily v. Parker, Johnson v. Luhman, Miller v. Monsen, Russisk v. Hicks, see note
4 supra.
Miller v. Monsen, see note 4 supra.
Taylor v. Keefe, see note 4 supra.
For a more complete rebuttal of the policy factors stated in Taylor v. Keefe, see
see 20 Cornell Law Quarterly 257 (1935).
Daily v. Parker (Illinois Federal Court) and Russick v. Hicks (Michigna Federal
Court), see note 4 supra.
This was the first case recognizing the child's right of action. Comments are to be
found in 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 375 (1946), 46 Col. L. Rev. 464 (1946), 59 Harv. L.
Rev. 297, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 444, 30 Minn. L. Rev. 310, 19 So. Calif. L. Rev. 455 and
32 Va. L. Rev. 420 (1946).
See note 2 supra.
Rudley v. Tobias and Katz v. Katz, see note 4 supra.
Katz v. Katz, see note 4 supra.
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ation provisions 17 as faced the court in the principal case, held that all
suits of this gendre were abolished, and not solely those brought by a spouse.
In 1941, Wyoming adopted a heart-balm statute akin to the New York
and New Jersey Acts.' 8 Whether these statutory restrictions would prevent
an infant from suing a third party paramour of his parent in Wyoming
must of necessity be speculative inasmuch as no attempt has at any time
been made to bring such action. Helpful dicta is virtually non-existent. 19
If a Wyomnig court were to utilize the alienation of affections provision 2u
as did the New York courts, the action would be barred. If, as in the
instant case, the legislation were thought inapplicable, then an examination of the practical objections which make recognition of the child's suit
undesirable 2 ' would have to be undertaken. Since these questions, as well
as the right of the judiciary to sanction a cause of action unknown at
Common Law have never been decided in Wyoming2 2 it is impractical
to predict what holding would be forthcoming. It can only be observed
that there is substantial precedent to allow Wyoming judges to rule either
way.
M. MICHAEL HOCH
17.
18.
19.

20.

21.
22.

See note 2 supra.
See note 2 supra.
Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P.2d 649 (1935); 51 Wyo. 488, 68 P.2d 881 (1937).
Dictum perhaps indicates that the traditional alienation suit in Wyoming was a
type of derivation action, the spouse suing in behalf of the children as well as fo,
its own benefit. A child's suit would therefore fall into the same category as an
action by a spouse for alienation of affection, and accordingly be prohibited by the
Wyoming heart-balm statute.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 Sec. 3-512 provides as does the N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act 61-a and
N. J. Stat. Ann. Sec. 2.39A-1 the following: "The remedies heretofore provided by
law for the enforcement of actions based upon alleged alienation of affections,
criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry, having been subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation
and pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing, who were merely the victims of circumstances, and such remedies having been
exercised by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment, and such remedies
having furnished vehicles for the commission or attempted commission of crime
and in many cases having resulted in the perpetration of frauds, it is hereby
declared as the public policy of the state that the best interests of the people of the
state will be served by the abolition of such remedies. Consequently, in the public
interest, the necessity for the enactment of this article is hereby declared as a matter
of legislative determination."
See 20 Cornell L. Q. 257 (1935); contra, 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 276 (1935).
McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943). The opinions intimate
that members of the Supreme Court would be willing to acknowledge a cause of
action, unrecognized at either common law or by appropriate legislation.

